The American Political Science Review

VOL. XXVII OCTOBER, 1933 NO. 5

NATIONALISM AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TODAY*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The world today is appallingly interesting. It is interesting, because it is changing so fast. It is appalling, because almost every change we have witnessed in the course of the last years has been a change for the worse. As mankind is ever proceeding from the past, through the present, toward the future, all change may, in the purely dynamic sense of the term, be called progress. If, however, we seek to estimate the value of change in terms of human welfare, as also if we consider it in the light of the goals pursued, the most significant recent changes in the political and economic spheres are clearly reactionary.

For generations, and in some cases for centuries, all nations within the orbit of our Western civilization have, through wars and revolutions, been striving to secure for all their members greater physical and moral security, greater political equality, greater individual freedom. Greater security—that is, more assured protection against the violence of their fellow-citizens and against the arbitrary oppression of their governments. Greater equality—that is, less discrimination on grounds of race, of sex, of religious and philosophical creed and of social position. Greater freedom—that is, more latitude for the self-expression and self-assertion of the individual in the face of the authority of tradition and of the state. Guarantees for the protection of the fundamental rights of man, the abolition of arrest without trial and of imprisonment for debt, the suppression of slavery, the extension of the suffrage to all and thereby the subordination of the government to the will of the peo-

* A paper read before the Geneva Institute of International Relations on August 14, 1933.

ple (that is, of the majority of all the people), parliamentary control of the budget (that is, no taxation without representation), the recognition of freedom of thought, of speech, of assembly, of the press, the independence of the judiciary and the autonomy of the university—such are some of the ideals for which our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers fought, bled, and died. Such are some of the conquests of human dignity over barbarism, of knowledge over ignorance, of right over might, which they triumphantly achieved and which they proudly bequeathed to us. And such are some of the ideals which, after the greatest struggle in human history, we their children of the twentieth century, through stupidity and cowardice are, sometimes with the blind enthusiasm of mad fanaticism and sometimes with the dull resignation of impotence, disavowing, renouncing, abandoning. The individual, the family, the local or regional community, everything and everybody, is being sacrificed to the state. The state itself, once held to be the protector and the servant of the people, is in several countries of our Western civilization being turned into a weapon for oppressing its own citizens and threatening its neighbors, according to the capricious will of one or of a few self-appointed individuals. These individuals, whether they style themselves chiefs, leaders, or dictators, are all what free men of all times, in all climes, have combatted as tyrants. They are today acclaimed as heroes by hundreds of thousands of European youths, welcomed as saviors by millions of European bourgeois, and accepted as inevitable by tens of millions of European senile cowards of all ages.

If, as I expect to occur, I am accused of exaggeration, I beg my critics to take a sketch map of the world. Let them mark in black the areas subjected to régimes such as I have indicated and leave in white those which are governed in conformity with the ideals of freedom that inspired the British, American, and French revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I accept their judgment as to the present state of the world, and particularly of Europe.

Is it surprising, under these circumstances, that the League of Nations, which some of its founders wished to call the League of Free Nations, should be undergoing a crisis so severe as to menace its very existence? The League of Nations is an attempt to realize, on the international plane, the ideals of government which its

founders rejoiced in within their own respective countries. Human freedom, guaranteed by the organized community against the aggression and the oppression of the violent few; human welfare, promoted by the spontaneous and orderly coöperation of all for the benefit of all—such were the national ideals which President Wilson, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, Léon Bourgeois formulated in the Covenant for the benefit of the international community. As long as this conception of the good life, national and international, remains that of a sufficient number of sufficiently convinced and powerful members of the League, so long will the League endure. But only when it becomes that of the overwhelming majority of the human race and is recognized and proclaimed as such by their governments can the League truly prosper.

Students of the League of Nations in 1933 should realize to the full its present plight and seek to understand the reasons thereof. Especially is this true of those who study the League not merely with a desire to satisfy their own scientific curiosity, but also with the will to contribute to the success of its endeavors and to the triumph of its ideals. Official optimism, always a nauseous dish for the mind of the honest, if it could perhaps in prosperous times be excused as a useful stimulant for the will of the feeble, would today act as a sickening and deadly opiate on the minds and wills of all. Not only the friends of truth, but especially also the real friends of the League, should therefore today, meeting at its bedside, take full cognizance of the gravity of the patient's condition and inquire into the true nature and causes of its illness in order to be in a position to determine and to recommend the necessary remedies.

That the League is ill will doubtless escape the attention of no observer, no matter how casual, how superficial, or how blindly optimistic. To be sure, the new buildings are progressing, or—to avoid that ambiguous term—being completed. To be sure, committees and subcommittees are continuing to meet, interpreters to interpret, *précis* writers to draft minutes, officials to produce intelligent memoranda, and delegates to deliver lengthy speeches. To be sure, the states members of the League are continuing to pay their contributions, although somewhat less promptly and fully, and to send representatives to Geneva, although perhaps not as many nor as influential representatives as some years ago. To be sure, most of the political, administrative, and technical activities are being carried on, and some are achieving results truly useful for

the states themselves and for their mutual relations. To be sure, finally, the main conferences summoned by the League have never been attended by so many official delegations, and the coöperation of non-member states, particularly the United States and Soviet Russia, has never been as continuous, as intimate, and—one would like to be able to add with more confidence—as fruitful.

I would be the last to underestimate the real importance of all the work done by the League and its servants and, thanks to the League, by the states themselves, their governments, and their delegates. The very existence of the Covenant, even if its provisions are sometimes violated, and the very existence of the League, even if its recommendations are often disregarded, are politically valuable, as is morally valuable the conscience of the most inveterate sinner. They offer an occasion for international discussion which, even when it leads to no positive results in the form of agreements, does most helpfully contribute to mutual understanding. The ease with which such discussions are initiated and the atmosphere of orderly freedom and impartiality in which they are pursued are gains which the world owes the League, and which enlightened and unbiased pre-war statesmen and students never tire of emphasizing in the light of their own less fortunate recollections. Furthermore, besides this advantage which a knowledge of the past brings to our attention, there is another perhaps still more significant advantage which the future may reveal. The Covenant and the League, by their very existence, continuously offer the world the opportunity of constructive alternative policies to those which, in spite of the Covenant and of the League, are so generally and so disastrously being pursued today. When contemporary statesmanship shall have exhausted the cruelly disappointing possibilities of the exclusive nationalism to which it is condemning the world, it may well revert to the Covenant and find therein both consolations and exhortations similar to those which the surviving politicians of the Southern Confederacy, after the Civil War, doubtless found in President Lincoln's speeches and messages.

That the world is better off today for the League of Nations is obvious to my mind. But that the League of Nations is very badly off in a world disloyal to its Covenant and indifferent to its promises, strikes me as no less obvious. It is to a brief attempted diagnosis of the League's illness that the remainder of this paper will be devoted.

Besides, and overshadowing, its many varied activities, to which allusion has already been made and whose importance has already been recognized, the League has, in the course of the last year, been engaged in three major enterprises: the attempted peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute by the Council and the Special Assembly; the attempted reduction and limitation of national armaments by the so-called Disarmament Conference; and the attempted world economic reconstruction by the Monetary and Economic Conference. Three major attempts, three major failures.

It is now my unpleasant but necessary task to show briefly, but quite ruthlessly, that, how, and why these attempts were failures. I find no better analogy to evoke than that of the dental surgeon and of his equally unpleasant, necessary, and ruthless task. A very discreet allusion, I hope, will suffice, when I say that no tooth is ever well filled unless the decayed cavity be completely cleared of all soft matter, regardless of the momentary comfort of the patient, and even of the life of some of his nerves!

II. THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Of the three failures of the League about which I have now to report, that of the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict is perhaps the most serious in itself and the most far-reaching in its repercussions, as it is certainly the most spectacular.

It was a failure, first, because it led to an open breach of the Covenant, as well as of at least two other international treaties, by a state permanently represented on the Council. That the attitude of Japan toward China in Manchuria and in Shanghai and toward the League in Geneva was an example of the "open, just, and honorable relations between nations" which the signatories of the Covenant prescribed for themselves in its Preamble; that Japan displayed the will to make "of the understandings of international law" "the actual rule of" its "conduct among governments;" that her policy was characterized by the desire to maintain "justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another"—all this cannot honestly be asserted. The undoubted and much-stressed fact that the Chinese of today cannot be described as an "organized people" does certainly not relieve Japan of its international obligations toward China; nor would any responsible Japanese statesman before the outbreak of 1931 have claimed that it did so.

That Japan has since that date respected and preserved "as against external aggression the territorial integrity" of China, as she was bound to do under Article 10, cannot seriously be held by anyone. That the conflict was examined by the Council and by the Assembly at the request of China, that after much hesitation, delay, negotiation, and inquiry, the Assembly rendered the report called for under the provisions of Article 15, and that that report was "unanimously agreed to by the members . . . other than the representatives of one . . . of the parties to the dispute," are matters of common knowledge. That China accepted the report and complied with its recommendations, and that Japan was therefore legally debarred, under Article 15, paragraph 6, from "going to war" with her cannot be denied. In order therefore to free Japan, who pursued her aggression after the verdict of the Assembly, of the accusation of having violated her undertakings on this point, one has to claim that the continuance of the use of organized military force against complying China is not synonymous with "going to war." When a case can be made to rest on no better arguments than on such verbal quibbles, it is assuredly desperate.

Japan has openly broken her international pledges by initiating, pursuing, and bringing to a successful close an aggression against one of her neighbors, like her a member of the League, and by wantonly disregarding all contrary provisions of the Covenant. Her decision to leave a League of Nations so contrary in its fundamental principles and in the unanimous views of its so different members to the present temper of her government, is a tacit admission of the fact, if further proof were necessary.

For this first reason alone, the Sino-Japanese conflict has been a misfortune for the League. To have lost, morally through her felony, and materially through her resignation, a charter member, is for the structure of an already weak League a very serious blow. This, however, is not in my estimation the gravest aspect of the matter. The League was created to maintain peace, if need be among its own members. That one or several of them might resort to war in disregard of their pledges was foreseen and provided for by its founders. One may even say that the League would forfeit most of its justification if such an event could be dismissed as being without the realm of practical politics. That Japan has violated the Covenant is in every sense deplorable. But so far we have noted no fact that has humbled the League or shaken its authority.

The second and much more serious aspect of the dispute from the point of view of the League is that Japan violated the Covenant not only, as we have seen, with defiance, but also with complete impunity, and therefore, as far as one can judge historical events which have not yet run their full course, with complete success. Thereby she has dealt a crushing blow not merely to the structure of the League, but to its prestige and to its *raison d'être* in the eyes of the world. The machinery expressly set up under the Covenant for the maintenance of peace and the protection of the law-abiding has failed lamentably to function, or—what is perhaps more accurate but hardly more hopeful—it has functioned only verbally and not actually. Like a motor in action, disconnected from the car which it was intended to drive, the machinery of the League has been turning for nearly two years. But it has, amidst the protests, denunciations, complaints, and imprecations of its engineers, left stranded by the roadside the chariot of peace and justice which it was intended to propel on a course of triumphant achievement.

This failure is equally grave in its immediate cause and in its direct and indirect consequences. Its immediate cause is to be found in what may brutally but not inaccurately be called the disloyalty to the League of all the member states. As we have seen, in effect and in spite of all the legalistic subtleties which have been produced to disguise the fact, Japan resorted to war in disregard of her covenants against a state which had accepted the unanimous decision of the other members of the League. This very case is provided for under the Covenant by Article 16, the first three paragraphs of which have no other purpose than to organize the protection of the victim of unjustified aggression. Just because, for the reasons I am deploring, those provisions were hushed out of existence in the final stages of the Sino-Japanese discussion in Geneva, they shall be quoted *in extenso* here. They read as follows:

1. Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the

several governments concerned what effective military, naval, or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the League which are coöperating to protect the covenants of the League.

Japan, as we have seen, violated her covenants not to resort to war. But who, after examining carefully and frankly the situation in the light of the just quoted clauses, can in all intellectual honesty deny that Japan's example was followed by her fellow-members? Under paragraph 1 of Article 16, they undertook to apply certain specific sanctions to the covenant-breaking state, but in fact there has, on their part, been no "severance of all trade or financial relations," no "prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state," no "prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state." And there has, of course, been no consideration by the Council, in pursuance of what would have been its duty under paragraph 2, of the "effective military, naval, or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

On the contrary, far from being isolated and outlawed, as the Covenant—to say nothing of the Kellogg Pact—provides, Japan is being treated by her associates in the League with all the consideration due to an equal and powerful accomplice. Thus the failure of the international community to live up to its duties of self-protection in the person of each of its members, which is the immediate cause of the inefficacy of the peace machinery in the case of the Sino-Japanese dispute, has been a third factor of the League's weakness.

A fourth is to be found in the consequences of this collapse. By failing to protect China, the League has disappointed not only the Chinese victims of its impotence, but its other friends and supporters all over the world. By forfeiting their confidence in its ability to meet the emergencies it was essentially created to meet, it has

rendered immeasurably more difficult propaganda in its favor. When one realizes the importance of public opinion in international affairs, that loss which, in its turn, entails a diminution of the League's vitality, seems almost irreparable. Not the man in the street alone, but also all thoughtful and responsible statesmen, are tempted to conclude from the League's paralysis in the Sino-Japanese dispute that it can under no circumstances be looked to as a protector of the victims of any aggression that may take place in future. This view, which is very widely held, and has even been openly expressed in official League circles, is the major cause of the League's second failure, in the sphere of disarmament.

Before turning to that, we must seek to discover, behind the outstanding facts just recalled, the deeper causes of the League's impotence in the Sino-Japanese dispute. These causes, which I will state with the same frankness shown in describing their effects, explain and thereby to some extent may excuse the failings of the League.

The first of these causes I see in the deplorably disorganized state of China. When a country is palpably unable to govern itself, when even under the stress of foreign invasion its rival governments, generals, and armies cannot sink their differences in a common effort of national defense, when its principal leaders are so uncertain of their own policies and so fearful of the consequences of drastic action that they refrain from breaking off their diplomatic relations with the aggressor against whom they claim the protection of the rest of the world, then surely there is some excuse for the rest of the world if it is reluctant to engage its last resources in an attempt to secure that purpose.

A most unsatisfactory customer for the League China is, not only by reason of its internal state, but also by reason of its geographical position. It so happens—and friends of the League like to think that it is no mere accident—that Japan's victim is placed between two other great Powers, neither of which is a member of the League. Without the coöperation both of Soviet Russia on land and of the United States on the sea, it is difficult to conceive of a possible military action in favor of China against Japan. And without the coöperation of either, it is clearly impossible. Now, not only the military, but even the economic, coöperation of the United States and of the Soviet Republic was unavailable in Geneva. It was, in fact, so obviously unavailable that it was not even sought.

It is uncertain whether it would really have been welcomed in the leading capitals of Europe, even if it had been available. But who doubts that Japan's aggressive action was materially facilitated by the absence from the Council and the Assembly of the representatives of the Soviets, and that it was not substantially impeded by the intermittent and almost casual appearance of American observers?

These two circumstances alone might have explained the inability of the League to bring about a fair and peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute. For neither of them could the League nor any of its leading members be made responsible. Had there been no other impediments, the lesson taught by the events would have been simple, or rather, if one may use the phrase, simply double. On the one hand, China would have been reminded once again of the wisdom of the saying concerning heaven's helping only those who help themselves. On the other hand, the League would once more have been made to realize the advantages, nay the necessity, of its becoming universal in membership.

But although the Sino-Japanese conflict has undoubtedly revealed these two impediments and brought home these two lessons, it would be a most superficial analysis that discovered no other obstacles and pointed to no other conclusions. No careful observer of the events, in Geneva, in London, in Paris, in Tokyo, in Nanking, and elsewhere, could fail to note that inhibitions of another order were also paralyzing the League.

On Great Britain, as the leading naval power, as the mistress of Hongkong, as the head of an empire including Australia, India, New Zealand, and Canada, and as the most important Western trader and financier in the Far East, rested the main burden of responsibility in the Council and in the Assembly. At no time had one the impression that British policy was determined essentially by the will to uphold the Covenant and to protect China. No British ship was moved. No word of direct and unequivocal warning was uttered. No consistent and persistent effort was made to enlist American and Russian coöperation. The British ambassador in Tokyo was reported as being not at all hostile to the action of Japan. Considerations relating to the security of British possessions and British dominions and the promotion of immediate British economic and political interests were always paramount. In London, Japan seemed throughout to enjoy real popularity. When the

Foreign Secretary declared that under no circumstances would his government allow Great Britain to be brought into conflict with her former ally in the Far East, his statement was well received in the House and in the press.

Nor was the attitude of France fundamentally different. Mindful of the position of Indo-China in Asia, and far from indifferent to Japanese diplomatic support in Europe, particularly at the Disarmament Conference, her conception of the League as the essential guarantor of security and as the supreme supporter and enforcer of treaties seemed strangely limited to her own continent. Italy, whose rôle was modest, could not be expected boldly to oppose the policy of Japanese imperialism based on notions of racial superiority and of demographic expansion very familiar and very dear to her present chief. Germany, with so many irons in the fire on her own borders, did not dream of offending the Great Power of the Far East in the interests of prostrate China. As, in spite of her anarchy, China was an appreciable present market and a potentially important future market, no one openly abandoned her. But as Japan, with all her burden of international sins, was a still more active customer and a more formidable factor on the political chessboard, the attitude of the Great Powers of the League toward Tokyo was more that of outwardly aggrieved but really benevolent neutrality than that of stern and vigilant justice.

It was left to the minor states, and especially to Spain, Ireland, and Czechoslovakia, to uphold the principles of the Covenant. This they did with genuine energy, but of course with little risk to themselves, as with no decisive influence on the course of events in the Far East.

The sad but obvious fact was, and is, that all of the leading states were, and are, more or less openly subordinating to their immediate national interests their duties to the Covenant, to the League, and to the cause of world security and international justice. In this respect, the Sino-Japanese conflict has evidenced with more dazzling clarity than any other event the supremacy of centrifugal, national forces over the centripetal, world tendencies in our present civilization. Ever since the founding of the League, this supremacy has been the main obstacle to its progress; it, alas, may still prove its final undoing.

One could find a fourth, less tangible but perhaps not less fundamental, cause of the League's impotence in the general realization

of the unsatisfactory nature of the Covenant as at present interpreted as a means for peacefully bringing about necessary changes in international law. It is impossible here to go into the details of Sino-Japanese relations. They are lucidly summed up in the Lytton Report. But no reader of that remarkable document, which has done more than any other single factor to save the League's honor in all this dismal affair, can deny that Japan has a case against China. According to all historical precedent, and also to a natural sense of historical justice, Japan, by reason of the nature and density of her population and by reason of her political and administrative superiority, cannot indefinitely be held in check by the whole world. Unless and until the League devises some legal means of authorizing, regulating, and controlling normal and inevitable expansion, it will be exposed to outbursts of violence such as that of Japan in Manchuria.

As the safest, and in fact the only, means of preventing revolution nationally is to provide for constitutional methods of constitutional revision, so the prevention of international war imperatively demands the institution and effective application of methods of pacific treaty revision. The drafters of the Covenant, particularly President Wilson, were fully aware of this necessity. But it is questionable whether Article 19, which bears witness thereto, will prove a sufficiently elastic safety valve to forestall future explosions. Here also the pacific organization of mankind would seem to call for a greater measure of subordination of national sovereignty to the interests, needs, and rights of the world community. All of these circumstances, I believe, should be taken into account if one is clearly to understand and fairly to judge the impotence of the League in the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

III. DISARMAMENT

I come now to what I have called the second major failure of the League—that in the sphere of disarmament. Am I too pessimistic? Or at least, is it premature to speak of failure here?

To be sure, the League, which has been dealing with the topic for thirteen years, and the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, which has been in intermittent session for a year and a half, are far from admitting the failure. But are failures ever officially admitted in international affairs?

The unpalatable but indisputable fact is that the states of the

world are today spending more on their armaments in gold than they were before the war, and also than they were five years ago. That, in the present depression, this greater sum represents a smaller fraction of the world's income will be claimed by no one. Therefore, frankness obliges us to recognize that the League has thus far failed to achieve that "reduction of national armaments" which its members, in Article 8 of the Covenant, have declared to be necessary for "the maintenance of peace."

It may be argued, and in fact truthfully stated, that the "reduction of national armaments" contemplated in Article 8 was "to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." That the present state of armaments is not above that point may be, and is being, asserted on the best of impartial authority. That is precisely the calamity. If national armaments have been and are increasing, and if they are not today above the level deemed consistent with national safety, it must be concluded that international security has been shaken and not consolidated since the drafting of the Covenant. From that conclusion it is unfortunately impossible to escape.

If, as some have always held, and as impartial observers are more and more unanimously conceding, disarmament cannot be achieved except as a by-product of the organization of peace and the consolidation of international solidarity, then it is at least probable that the failure of the League heretofore effectively to reduce armaments should be attributed to its failure to organize peace and to consolidate international solidarity. And so it is, in my view.

But, it may be objected, surely the efforts of the Disarmament Conference, the instructive and useful discussions of the French, American, British, and Soviet proposals, the tentative agreements already reached concerning the principle of equality, concerning a permanent Disarmament Commission, concerning qualitative reductions, not to mention the American offers of political coöperation in emergencies—surely all this is progress. It *is* progress on the road toward a fuller appreciation of the real difficulties and of the real conditions of disarmament. But it will be progress on the road to disarmament only if and when armaments cease to increase and begin to be reduced as a result of the overcoming of these difficulties and of the fulfillment of these conditions.

Today, in so far as Europe is concerned, the essentials of the

position as they appear to me are briefly the following. The most pacific nations are relatively the most formidably armed. The least pacific, or those whose present temper and professed policies are least compatible with the maintenance of peace, are as yet deprived of major armaments. Disarmament to a basis of equality between the two groups of states means therefore the weakening of the pacific nations and the relative strengthening of their potential aggressors. In the absence of a League of Nations, or of any other international organization willing and able to protect the victims of aggression, one is therefore led to choose between a policy of disarmament and a policy of peace.

To make myself perfectly clear, I would ask: Is there anyone within or without Germany who honestly considers the present German régime to be peaceful in its instincts, in its desires, and in its intentions today, and who believes that it would be peaceful in its acts tomorrow if it had the power to go to war with reasonable hope of success? Certainly the countless Germans with whom I have spoken in the past months, including several who are far from hostile to the present régime, are not of that opinion, no more than the authors of the official speeches one can almost daily hear over the radio or read in the papers. Now if such is the situation, if Germany is inhibited from disturbing the peace of Europe solely, or at least mainly, by the consciousness of her present military inferiority, is it the duty of France and her allies, is it their right, to disarm? Furthermore, is it to the interests of peace that they should disarm?

Not *peace through disarmament*, as one would hope and as the authors of Article 8 of the Covenant expected, is the saving formula today. But *peace or disarmament*—such is the tragic dilemma that faces contemporary Europe. It is all the more tragic since it is obvious that the present unfortunately salutary inequality in armaments offends one's natural sense of justice and cannot subsist indefinitely. But is it really a dilemma? My answer is: Yes, in the present anarchical state of international relations. No, in a world of pacific nations, or, if that be inconceivable, in a world so organized, so constituted, so federated, that each of its national members could rely on the support of the international community as a whole, or at least of the overwhelming majority of its associates, if attacked by an aggressive neighbor.

If that is utopia, then the League of Nations, which is based on

that fundamental conception of international relations, is utopia. "The world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coërcion shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, common justice, and a common peace. God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and coöperation may be near at hand!" These noble words were uttered, not by an irresponsible dreamer, nor by the head of a belligerent state as a stimulant for the morale of his troops on the battlefield, nor by an insincere demagogue bent on overthrowing the government of his day. They were uttered on May 27, 1916, by President Woodrow Wilson.

The "great consummation" then heralded has not yet come about. The "day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and coöperation" then prayed for has not yet come. To some they seem even further removed in 1933 than they did in 1916. But the elements of the disarmament problem are the same today as then.

If you wish disarmament, you must work for the organization of peace. And if you really wish an effective organization of peace, you cannot tolerate the perpetuation of the riot of national sovereignties which is maintaining the world in a state of mutual suspicion and hostility, and is ever more transforming Europe into an armed camp.

IV. THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

Concerning the third major failure of the League, I shall be very brief. Not that I can share the reported opinion of the American Secretary of State, on his return home, to the effect that the World Economic Conference was "still alive and virile . . . and that it would eventually achieve success." Of course, "eventually" is a cautious term. But whether success is to be achieved in the course of the present year, as the statement seems to imply, or whether the Conference will be successful only when we shall no longer be among the living to applaud, there is no doubt that it has so far dismally failed.

Summoned to combat the depression, primarily by stabilizing the currencies and reducing the tariffs of the world, after the necessary preliminary solution of the international debt problem, the

Monetary and Economic Conference has not only failed to bring about any of the agreements foreshadowed on its agenda; it has actually left international economic relations in a more distressing state of uncertainty and confusion than they already were in when it convened. Nor is that either surprising or unexpected.

Ever since the great upheaval of the war, currencies have been unstable, tariffs have been rising, and all the states of the world have been drifting toward more or less openly avowed ideals of national self-sufficiency. Under the cyclical wave of prosperity which abruptly broke in the autumn of 1929, these anarchical and centrifugal tendencies were hidden from the view of the general public. But they were real, and they seemed inoffensive only to those who judge economic prosperity by the current rate of wages, the current price levels, and the current quotations of securities.

How a world which every advance of civilization and every material improvement tends to make more interdependent could hope to achieve lasting prosperity under a political régime which stressed and strove to realize the ideals of national independence also on the economic plane, is a mystery. The Economic Conference of 1927, meeting in the midst of what today seem almost unbelievably good times, was not blind to the dangers that threatened. Its warnings and its recommendations alike remained unheeded. The folly of economic nationalism, although deplored and denounced by nearly all, continued strangely enough to dictate the policy of nearly all. The inevitable result is the world as we see it today.

What is surprising is less that millions should be unemployed everywhere than that mankind should be able to continue to live without any increase in the death-rate. This is surely due not to the economic policies of the governments, but to the technical progress of industrial and agricultural production on the one hand, and of public hygiene on the other. Progress in these fields has been such as to enable the world economically to afford the folly of its nationalism. But, given that nationalism which unfortunately as yet shows no signs of abating, it was clearly an illusion to hope that an international conference, even if it had been well prepared by all the principal delegations, could in a month overcome the depression, or even lay the foundations for a future recovery.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Shall we conclude our consideration of this topic, shall we con-

clude our whole study, with an admission of the failure of internationalism? Only those who have followed me inattentively thus far could expect such a conclusion. Let the nationalists who are content with the world as it is speak of the failure of internationalism. Let those who delight in the triumph of might over right, as exemplified in the Sino-Japanese dispute, let those who rejoice in the ever-increasing burden and threat of national armaments, let those who revel in the sight of abandoned farms, of empty workshops, of impoverished schools and universities, of suffering families, of armies of unemployed—let these all join in hymns of hatred toward internationalism and in pæans in honor of triumphant nationalism. For nationalism is triumphant today, as are human humiliation, human anxiety, and human misery.

No, internationalism has not failed. What has failed is contemporary international statesmanship. It has failed because it has been unable or unwilling to practice that form, and to engage in that measure, of international coöperation which alone can save the world from the all too devastating evils and the all too obvious dangers of ruthless nationalism. What an internationalism too timid, too exclusively verbal, and too unimaginatively national has failed to give, we must demand of a bolder, wiser, and more generous conception of human relations. The League of Nations must go forward, from the modest beginnings of a Covenant too considerate of the traditions and prejudices of national sovereignty, toward the goal of world federation. Let its shy friends become bolder and its impatient critics more intelligent and more helpful. May our generation, which has already experienced miracles of destructive folly on every hand, live to witness and to perform the miracle of constructive wisdom which will unite all the peoples of the world into one living commonwealth of free nations!